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Summary
Although information security technologies (such as digital rights management prod-
ucts) has been proven effective and successful in protecting the confidentiality of
sensitive information by providing access control, these technologies have not been
widely adopted and used to their potential. One reason for this could be that cost and
benefit of these products have not been analysed in a systematic and quantitativeman-
ner to date. As a result, companies do not have an established procedure to evaluate
the cost and benefit of implementing these products. In this document, the benefits
of implementing a digital rights management product in enterprises are quantified
using stochastic Petri nets models and are compared with the security needs of a cor-
poration and potential costs incurred by the implementation process. An evaluating
procedure for implementing these products is established. This procedure has the
potential to be used to improve the ability of a corporation to make sensible security
investment decisions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many organizations maintain sensitive information or documents that should be accessed only by authorized personnel, for
example, personal health records in health institutions, bank statements and account balances for financial organizations. Con-
fidential information leakage and sensitive information distortion have been identified as one of the major information security
threats that cause reputation damage, identity theft and even threaten the viability of the company1,2,3. It is essential that com-
panies and organizations keep these information and documents safe. Enterprise information security technologies, e.g., Digital
Rights Management (DRM) systems, which are developed to address these concerns, use encryption to restrict the access of
protected information and documents to authorized end users.
Enterprise information security technologies were introduced in the 1990s4, however, they have not been widely implemented
and used to its full potential. The investment into an enterprise information security product involves massive uncertainty. There-
fore, one major hurdle for implementing these products maybe that organization, as potential users, do not have an established
procedure to evaluate the benefit, effectiveness, impact and cost of these products quantitatively.
Enterprise information security research has been traditionally focused on the technologies and products themselves, for
example, the architectures of system5, access control policies6,7,8,9,10, the functionality of products11. The impact of these prod-
ucts on business processes and the impact of human behaviour on the effectiveness of information security system have not been
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documented to date, although human behaviour has been identified as one of the critical factors that determine the effectiveness
of security measures12,13.
There has not been an established systematic approach or procedure to quantitatively evaluate the project economics of infor-
mation security technologies, including their effectiveness, benefits and costs to organizations, although information security
researchers proposed various methods for addressing security investment problems. For example, in14, the author proposed that
we should consider the costs of subsequent maintenance of the software products, and pointed out that real-world failures of
security protocols may sometimes be explained by economics14. However, this study did not point out any methodology to
solve these problems. In15, the authors considered that large system failures cost industry billions, thus, we need a better under-
standing of what sort of institutions can best evolve and manage large complex interconnected systems. In addition, the authors
introduced a novel framework for analysing information security problems. However, this study did not mention any mathemat-
ical model to analyse this framework. In16,17, the authors used mathematical models and stochastic simulations to examine the
effectiveness of security operation processes and protection mechanisms. In18, the authors proposed to use economic models
based on trade-off between information confidentiality, integrity and availability to assess the effectiveness and value of security
investment of a system. However, in these studies, the authors did not consider the time loss in the organizations by implement-
ing information security technologies. In19, the authors used economic models to measure the security risks in contemporaneous
businesses and organizations. However, this study did not consider the security metrics for analysing information security tech-
nologies. In20,21,22,23, the authors provided a system security model from the perspective of an adversary using stochastic activity
networks. However, the security metrics which were introduced in these studies focused on the adversary profile, they did not
consider the implementation of information security technologies in the systems. In24,25,26, the authors mentioned that we should
consider the cost and benefit of implementing information security policies in cloud computing systems, and introduced secu-
rity metrics to analyse the effect of security policies; however, they did not have a procedure to evaluate the benefit and cost of
implementing information security policies.
The primary objective of this study is, therefore, to establish a standard procedure for organizations to conduct cost-benefit
analyses for information security technologies using stochastic models. This procedure applies the concept of security metrics
and stochastic Petri nets to simulate the business processes and human behaviour involved in the information security technolo-
gies. Potential cost and benefit of deploying information security products can be evaluated in quantitative terms. Using this
procedure, not only different information security products can be compared in the same term, information security projects
can also be compared with other projects in the organizations’ portfolio in monetary terms. This information provides basis for
organizations to make sound investment decisions.
This document is organized as follows: Section 2 will introduce the methodology and quantitative evaluation procedure to
evaluate the information security technologies. Section 3 is the background on quantitative models. Section 4 is the Microsoft
Information Rights Management (MS IRM) case study. Section 5 is conclusions.
2 METHODOLOGY
The proposed evaluation procedure will focus on the following three aspects: the value or benefit that information security
technologies can bring to the organization; the effectiveness of the information security technologies and factors that will impact
the effectiveness; and finally, the cost and impact that information security technologies have on organizations.
In this procedure, information is treated as a business asset with varying levels of commercial values as introduced by27,28.
Since it is usually difficult to measure the benefits of information security technologies directly, costs of information disclose or
modification is measured instead to quantify the benefits as suggested by29.
In addition, human behaviour is an integrated part in this proposed procedure. Stochastic Petri nets are used to simulate the
behaviour and interactions of people who are involved within organizational functions. Human behaviour has been identified
as one of the critical factors that determine the effectiveness of security measures12,13,30. For example, information security
mechanism will not be effective, if individual employee does not comply with it or is not aware of it13. Company policies, e.g.,
the way documents are classified, affect the effectiveness of the information security technologies as well.
Finally, in this procedure, a method of quantitatively evaluating cost and impact of the information security technologies in
monetary is proposed. Some costs associated with the information security technologies are tangible, for example, the capital
expenditures on information security technologies and associated hardware, software and daily operational expenditures asso-
ciated with maintenance. These tangible costs are readily to be accounted for in monetary terms. There are also some intangible
Wen Zeng 3
1. Understand the working mechanism of information
security technologies
3. Gather information of the organization and statistics
on the human behaviour of staff members
5. Build stochastic Petri nets models
6. The economic model (NPV)
4. Define security metrics
2. Evaluate and classify the
information assets
FIGURE 1 The flow chart of the proposed quantitative evaluation procedure (QEP) for information security technologies.
costs. For example, it has been documented that implementing a strict security mechanism will reduce the efficiency of the
organization13,31. The request of security behaviour often has conflicts with and competes working hours with employee’s pro-
duction tasks13. In addition, encryption, a major function of information security technologies, often reduces the availability of
data and brings inconvenience to end users to use protected documents31. The impact of information security technologies on
staff productivity is quantified in terms of non-productive time (NPT) using the methodology proposed by32,33,34,35.
The proposed procedure for quantitative evaluation of information security technologies is summarized in Figure 1 and
described step by step below:
Step 1: Understand the working mechanism of the information security technologies in evaluation by testing the information
security products and by reading manuals or white papers provided by the information security product providers. Plot flow
charts, that represent the communications among users, servers, and administrators, will be created. These flow charts are the
prototype of the business process.
Step 2: Evaluate and classify the organization’s digital information assets. Study the organization’s information classification
policies, and classify the information into different categories by their level of confidentiality according to company policies.
Then assign estimated values to digital information assets of each category. This information valuation process should be based
on the business needs of the organization28. These values will be used in Steps 5 and 6 of this proposed procedure. Methods
and processes to evaluate the value of documents can be found in published works, e.g.,28,36,37,38.
Step 3: Gather information of the organization and statistics on the human behaviour of staff members in the organization.
These statistics include but not limited to: the total number of employees in the organization, the frequency that they use digital
documents or information, the response time that a user has to wait to receive assistance from an administrator etc. It has been
reported that most security incidents are caused by human errors instead of technology failures39, although security incidents
can result from nature disasters, technical issues and human acts19. Human acts can be further classified into two categories:
malicious or non-malicious. Malicious acts often include different types of human malicious acts13. Non-malicious acts are
usually caused by users who did not understand or ignored security policies. Typical violations include sharing of passwords
and not closing documents after viewing them, and so on19.
Three main techniques have been established and widely used to collect and analyse human behaviour data: questionnaires,
interviews, and action research. A questionnaire consists of a series of questions; respondents answer questions by completing
4 Wen Zeng
the questionnaire themselves40. An interview is a conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee, in which interviewer
elicit information from the interviewee40. Action research is a reflective process of progressive problem solving. Researcher
themselves are actively involved in the topic being researched. They work with each other to improve the current situation41.
In42,43, the authors introduced action research methods into information systems research. In44, the author successfully applied
the action research method to evaluate the impact of information security awareness training on users’ information security
behaviour.
Human behaviour data are critical inputs into the stochastic Petri nets model in Step 5. It might take significant time and effort
to gather this information; however, the better the quality of the statistics on user behaviour, the more accurate the results of the
evaluation of the information security technologies will be. In general, if the model is more complex, more data are needed.
Step 4: Define security metrics. Security metrics are a series of criteria that are defined to help organization measure the suc-
cess of security investments; security metrics enable organization to know how well the security products or security strategies
are meeting the security objectives. Most security metrics cover these four different aspects: perimeter defense capability, cov-
erage and control, availability and reliability, application risks45. The value of each item in the metrics will be generated by the
stochastic model in Step 5.
For example, the number of digital documents protected by the DRM product is a measure of DRM product perimeter defense
capability; the number of workstations covered by DRM product is the measure of the coverage of control of DRM product; the
amount/percentage of documents that cannot be accessed by authorized users is a measure of the availability and reliability of
the DRM product. The number of users who share password to open protected document is the measure of the application risks
of the DRM product. For cloud computing systems, the value of opacity or diagnosability is the measure of information flow
security after implementing security policies in the systems24,46,25. Information on choosing and defining security metrics can
be found in previous publications, e.g.,45,47.
Step 2, 3 and 4 can be executed concurrently, because one step can assist the others. For example, when we classify the
organization’s digital information assets, we should consider who are the main users of these information assets and what kind
of security metrics we should use to evaluate the benefit or cost of implementing information security technologies to protect
these assets.
Step 5: Build a stochastic Petri net model that includes a set of ordered activities to be undertaken by humans or other
resources of the organization. This stochastic Petri net model is a structure for actions and implies on how work is done within an
organization. These actions are work activities across time and space, with a beginning and an ending48. Users in the organization
use digital information and documents to do their daily work. Information classification policies and human behaviour shapes
the business process in the organization. After the stochastic Petri net model is constructed, parameters collected and defined in
Step 3 is input into the model. Model outputs are used to calculate the security metrics that are defined in Step 4.
Step 6:Account all the tangible and intangible costs of information security technologies and calculate the Net Present Value
(NPV) of information security technology implementation project using the results from Step 5. The calculated NPV is then
used to help information security manager to make security investment decisions. Further information on NPV and economic
model can be found in previous publications, e.g.,29,49.
3 BACKGROUND ON QUANTITATIVE MODELS
3.1 Petri Nets Mechanism
The core part of the procedure proposed in this paper is Step 5, in which the stochastic Petri nets are applied to simulate the
business processes in the organization. Stochastic Petri nets theory is introduced first in this section.
3.1.1 Petri Nets
Petri nets are a graphical modelling tool for a formal description of systems whose dynamics are characterized by concurrency,
synchronization, mutual exclusion and conflict50,51. In particular, they have been widely used for structural modelling of business
processes and have been applied in a wide range of qualitative and quantitative analyses50,52,53.
A basic Petri netN consists of two types of nodes, P l and T r, respectively called places and transition, a set F ⊆ (P l×T r)∪
(T r×P l) of arcs that connect the nodes, and the initial markingM0 ∶ P l → ℕ which is a mapping from the set of places to the
set ℕ of all non-negative integers.
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Input arcs start at places and end at transitions, while output arcs start at transitions and end at places. Places can contain
tokens, which are used to simulate the dynamic and concurrent activities of the system modelled by the net. The current state of
the modelled system (a marking) is given by the number of tokens in each place.
Transitions are the active components of the net. When a transition is executed (or fired), it consumes tokens along its input
arcs, and produces tokens along its output arcs. The resulting movement of the tokens changes the states of the system. A
transitions is only allowed to fire when it is enabled, which means that each input place holds at least one token.
One can associate a firing delay with each transition of a Petri net; such a delay specifies the time that the transition has to be
enabled before it can actually fire. If the delays are given by a random distribution function, we obtain a stochastic Petri net.
3.1.2 Stochastic Activity Networks
Stochastic Petri nets extend the classic Petri nets with timing and probability features, and stochastic activity networks (SANs) are
a class of stochastic Petri nets54,55. This permits the representation of both performance and dependability related characteristics,
depending on the interpretation given to the tokens in the model.
SANs consist of four primitive objects: Activities, places, input gates and output gates. Activities (‘transitions’ in Petri net
terminology) are two types, timed and instantaneous. Elongated ovals represent timed activities and solid bars represent instan-
taneous activities. Timed activities are used to represent activities of the modelled system, whose duration impact the system’s
ability to perform. Instantaneous activities represent system activities which, relative to performance variable in question, com-
plete in a negligible amount of time. Places are depicted as circles and, as with Petri nets, each place can hold a non-negative
number of tokens.
Cases (a generalization of probabilistic arcs) can be associatedwith both timed and instantaneous activities and are represented
by small circles. Cases permit the realization of two types of spatial uncertainty. Uncertainty about which activities are enabled
in a given marking is realized by cases associated with intervening instantaneous activities. Uncertainty about the next marking
assumed upon completion of a timed activity is realized by cases associated with that activity. Input gates contain both an
enabling predicate and input function (on the marking of the places). The enabling predicate must be true for the activity
associated with that gate to be enabled. Upon completion of the associated activity, the input function is executed, possibly
changing the marking of the net. Output gates have a single output function (on the marking of the places) associated with them,
which is executed upon completion of the associated activity.
The stochastic nature of the nets is realized by associating an activity time distribution functionwith each of the timed activities
and a probability distribution with each set of cases. In32,33,34,35, the authors proposed to use the firing delay to model the NPT
when users have to wait on the response from DRM administrators to help them with digital document access issues.
Reward models are used to specify measures of system behaviour. A reward model consists of a stochastic process and a
reward structure. The stochastic process represents the dynamics of the system and can be constructed by hand or, automatically,
from some network level description. The reward structure is typically a set of one or more functions defined on the states or
transitions between states in the process.
A reward model in SANs has two different reward components: one is concerned with ‘rate rewards’, that is, the rate at which
reward accumulates while the process is in a specified set of markings during an interval of time; and the other is concerned
with ‘impulse rewards’, based on the count of the number of times an activity fires during an interval of time. The functions
used to capture the activity and marking based rewards in a SAN, with places P l and activities A, are given as follows:
–  ∶ A → ℝ. For each a ∈ A, (a) denotes the reward obtained due to the completion of activity a.
–  ∶ (P l,ℕ) → ℝ. For each v ∈ (P l,ℕ),(v) denotes the rate of reward obtained when for each (pl, n) ∈ v, there are
n tokens in place pl.
where ℕ is the set of natural numbers, and (P l,ℕ) is the set of all partial functions from P l to ℕ.
Impulse rewards are associated with activity completion (via ) and rates rewards are associated with the number of tokens
in sets of places (via).
In the following, variable types of the interval category are denoted by ‘Y’ while variables types of the time-averaged category




(v) ⋅ J v[t,t+l] +
∑
a∈A




In the above, the reward accumulated is related to the number of times each activity completes and time spent in particular
markings, during a time interval [t, t + l].
– J v[t,t+l] is a random variable representing the total time that the SAN is in a marking such that for each (pl, n) ∈ v, there
are n tokens in pl during [t, t + l].
– Na[t,t+l] is a random variable representing the number of completions of activity a during the interval [t, t + l].
3.2 Project Economics
For corporations and organizations to make sound decisions on the implementation of an information security system, all the
associated costs and benefits over a multi-year period have to be taken into account. In this proposed procedure, the concept of
net present value (NPV) from economics, project management and decision making science is adopted to quantify the value of
an information security technology implementation project. NPV takes the time value of money into consideration. The basic
concept is that money spent or obtained in the future will have a discounted value than money spent or obtained in the present56.
NPV calculation is based on the principle of discounting; all the future cash flows are discounted back to the present time, which
means one pound today is worth (1 + i)t pound at time t in the future.






In which,−K is a capital costs now (K at time zero), t is the time of the cash flow,Rt is the benefits return of year t,Ct is ongoing
costs which is the cost of year t, i is the discount rate. Organizations usually have its own defined discount rate, although this
discount rate is in general tied to the national interest rate.
NPV is one of the most widely used decision making criteria. If the NPV of a project is positive, this project will generate
positive cash flow to the organization over a certain period, therefore, is beneficiary or profitable to the organization. However,
when the capital of an organization with a portfolio of many profitable projects (NPV > 0) is constrained, not all the project
with a positive NPV can be invested. The organization usually set a value larger than 0; projects with higher NPV usually have
higher priorities for investment.
4 MICROSOFT INFORMATION RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
In this section, Microsoft Information Rights Management (MS IRM) is studied in order to illustrate the procedure proposed.
MS IRM is a DRM product developed by Microsoft Corporation. It is a Microsoft Office component, and can be implemented
through the RightsManagement Services (RMS) installed onWindows Server 2008,Windows Server 2008 R2,Windows Server
2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, or to a cloud tenant with an Azure RMS subscription57.
4.1 MS IRM System Analysis
According to the proposed procedure, the first step is to understand the working mechanism of the information security prod-
ucts by reading the information security products user manual and by testing using the software. General information on the
architecture, major components and major functionalities of DRM system is available in previous publications58,59,60,61.
One key feature of the MS IRM is that MS IRM centrally manages documents and messages, and uses encryption to keep
the information secure no matter where it has been transferred. Authorized users use decryption keys to open the document
and access the information57,62,63. Administrators who have unlimited access to this centralized space play a key role in the
IRM business process. Administrators manage protected documents or messages by defining and changing policies for all the
documents or messages and authorized users regardless of the document location. Administrators create new authorized users
or delete existing authorized users from the user list of the document or message57,62. The workflow of creating and viewing
a protected document by authorized users is illustrated in Figure 2. When a user tries to open a protected document (process
7), the centralized server will check the authentication of the user. If the authentication fails, the user has to seek help from the
administrator. The administrator will then check the identity of the user to make sure that the user has the status to access the
document and add this user to the authorized user list of the particular document (processes 4 and 5).
The working mechanism in an MS IRM environment is described below:
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FIGURE 2 A simple representation of the working mechanism of MS IRM product. This chart illustrates the relationship
between the MS IRM server, administrators, and users.
1. An administrator uses an IRM-enabled application to create a normal document or message. When the administrator
chooses the restrict permission option, the IRM controller is triggered. The IRM controller immediately requests a user-
name and a password from the administrator. When the administrator’s response is sent to the server, the server validates
the client. If the information is validated; the administrator can define users and users’ rights for this document or message.
2. The IRM controller encrypts the document or message with a random symmetric key, and then sends a request for a
publishing license directly to the IRM server. The request includes the random symmetric key, usage policies assigned to
the encrypted document or message.
3. The IRM server encrypts the symmetric key with the server public key. Then the IRM server generates a publishing
license, which includes the encrypted symmetric key, rights policy assigned to the encrypted document and the Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) of the IRM server. IRM server then encrypts the publishing license with public key. Users and
documents, rights and private key are kept in the IRM server.
4. The server returns the publishing license to the administrator side, and binds the publishing license to the encrypted
document file.
5. Administrator distributes the document.
6. When a user tries to open anMS IRM protected document, the IRM controller is triggered on the user side, which requests
the username and password information from this user.
7. The IRM controller sends a license request to IRM server. The license request includes the user’s Rights Management
Account Certificate (RAC), content identity, public key, publishing license, and the rights policy information.
8. The license generator on the server checks whether or not the user is authorized (the user’s identity is present in the user
identities repository). If the user’s identity does not match the present identity in the identities repository, the server rejects
creating use license. After the license generator confirms all the information, the license generator decrypts the symmetric
key using the private key of the server, re-encrypts it using the public key of the user, and creates user license (which
contains the symmetric key for decrypting the document and the rights information) for the user.
9. User license is sent back to client side, the IRM controller uses license to decrypt and open the encrypted document.
4.2 Document Classification and Value
Documents or messages can be classified into many levels according to their confidentiality and the impact in the event their
confidentiality is compromised28. In this case study, documents in the organization are divided into two levels: confidential and
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unclassified documents. Users need a username and password to open confidential documents. It assumes that there are 4000
sensitive documents in the organization that need to be protected by MS IRM. 50% of sensitive documents in the organization
are classified as confidential documents.
One reason for document classification is for practical purpose. It is often time-consuming and cost prohibitive to assign
a value to each single document that needs to be protected. Once the document is classified, however, a single value can be
assigned to a particular class. In this case study, the financial value of a confidential document is assigned to be £25, 00028.
4.3 User Behaviour Study
A set of assumptions on user behaviours are made (Table 1). In this table, the first five parameters: the number of authorized
users in the organization, the number of documents that an authorized user might use every day on average, the number of normal
working hours per day, the number of working weeks per year, and the number of administrators – these five parameters depend
entirely on the size and business type of different organizations. Therefore, the values of these parameters are determined by
literature based assumptions.
Other four parameters of the model can be gathered by previous research works and experiments. Average time service need
to serve each user – the values of this parameter are the measurements from a real Google service64. Average time administrators
need to help each user – this interview is taken in Newcastle University33. Average time users need to spend to pass user
authentication – this experiment is taken in Newcastle University33. Percentage of time when authorized users experience a
login system failure – this parameter is based on the experiment in University College London65.
Parameters Value
1 Number of authorized users in the organization 50
2 Number of documents, a user might use every day on average 8
3 Number of normal working hours per day 8
4 Number of working weeks per year 52
5 Number of administrators in the organization 1
6 Average time service need to serve each user 0.01seconds
7 Average time administrators need to help each user 4.5 minutes
8 Average time users need to pass user authentication 7.33 seconds
9 Percentage of time when authorized users experience a login system
failure and attempt ask administrator for help
0.70 %
TABLE 1 Data on human behaviour within the organization. Human behaviour is an important factor in the effectiveness of
MS IRM. User behaviour data are critical input parameters of the stochastic Petri nets model. In general, they are gathered using
questionnaire, interview, or action research methods.
4.4 Security Metrics
Step 4 of this proposed procedure is to define security metrics in order to measure the confidentiality and availability of docu-
ments. MS IRM uses encryption to keep documents secure; this process decreases the availability of documents to unauthorized
users. As discussed previously, the value of the implementation of MS IRM product is best measured by the cumulative value of
all the confidential documents if they were disclosed to or modified by unauthorized users. The metrics for MS IRM are defined
in Table 2.
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User’s Type Executive Document Type
1 unauthorized cannot read unclassified
2 unauthorized cannot read confidential
TABLE 2 Security metrics defined to evaluate the effectiveness of the MS IRM system. It is in general difficult to measure the
benefit of information security product. The potential cost when document is leaked or compromised is usually defined instead.
The number of confidential and unclassified documents is therefore defined to evaluate the benefit of the MS IRM products.
4.5 Stochastic Petri Nets Model Description and Results
Step 5 of the proposed procedure is to build a stochastic Petri net model and run this model. Data collected in Step 2, 3 and 4
are input into the stochastic Petri net model. The value of security metrics defined in Step 4 and the NPT will be generated by
the simulation runs.
Potential users of a document can be classified into two groups, authorized user and unauthorized users. For confidential
document, MS IRM requires users to log in using user’s log-in ID and password. Authorized users should possess correct
passwords to open documents that they have rights. However, authorized users might forget the password, because they might
not open these documents frequently. In this case, the user will have to contact the administrator to retrieve the password.
Administrators, however, are not always available, because they could be still handling previous requests. This will reduce the
efficiency of the organization and will result in NPT32.
For unauthorized users, since they do not suppose to possess the correct password, the chance for them to open a confidential
document is reduced. However, unauthorized users might try a certain number of times and open the document successfully, or
they might have acquired the correct passwords because of security leaks etc.
For authorized users, the main model objective is to quantify the reduction of working efficiency because of the changed
workflow after installing MS IRM. As discussed previously, the NPT associated with the implementation of information secu-
rity products is one of the main negative impacts on the organizations. In this proposed procedure, the NPT is modelled by
timed transitions of stochastic Petri nets as proposed by Zeng and van Moorsel32. Two types of delays can be incurred by the
implementation of MS IRM, the delay to pass authentication and the delay to wait for administrators’ help.
Figure 3 shows the structure of a SAN model representing business process associated with MS IRM we discussed. The
model consists of eight places, three timed transitions and three instantaneous transitions. Timed transitions are associated with
random exponential distributed firing delays.
FIGURE 3 A SAN model of an MS IRM system. A SAN model consists of places, transitions, and arcs that connect them. In
this figure, circles represent places, vertical lines represent transitions, and lines represent arcs. Note that the “thin" transition
with output places takes no time to execute, i.e., it is instantaneous. Informally, the middle transition Tut produces a token with
in one of the two output places with probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively.
Authorized users try to access protected resources every 1
ru
unit time. Place Users contains the users that may arrive to the
queue. The tokens in Users are the authorized users. We use Tu to control the frequency of access requests sent by a user, thus
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each completion of activity Tu represents the arrival of a request to the waiting room. Idle servers are represented by tokens in
place Idle_server, busy servers are represented by tokens in place Server. The time taken to access the protected resources is
given by Tser. The number of tokens inUsers represents the number of users who are trying to access resources, and the number
of tokens in Server represents the number of servers which are providing services to the users. In Figure 3, we have one black
token in Users and Idle_server, if we want to increase the number of users or servers, we can increase the number of black
tokens in these places.
If the user can pass the authentication process, then the user can use the resource; However, if the user cannot access the
resource, the user has to contact the administrators for help. Place Af_service contains all users who went through the server,
the probabilities on immediate transition Tut represents the users passed the authentication process and the users did not pass the
authentication process. Idle administrators are represented by tokens in place Idle_adm, busy administrators are represented
by tokens in place Adm_ℎelp. The time taken to help the users is given by Tadm. After obtaining such help, the user can try to
access the resource again. If we want to increase the number of idle administrators, we can increase the number of black tokens
in Idle_adm.
We assume that there are one user, one idle server, and one idle administrator in the system. Figure 4 shows the corresponding
reachability tree for the SAN model. The reachability tree has six nodes which represent six different states of the system.
Increasing the number of users, servers and administrators will increase the state space of the system.
FIGURE 4 Reachability tree for the SAN model.
The behaviour of the SAN model can be measured by the impulse rewards model and rate rewards model, which are sup-





The number of tokens in sets of places is computed according to the formula
∑
v∈(P l,ℕ)
(v) ⋅ J v[t,t+l].
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The time scale of the model is expressed in minutes, i.e., when we run the model one time unit in Möbius represents one minute
in real working time.
To measure the throughput of the server, the throughput of a transition per unit of time Tser was computed in average interval
of time [t, t + l]. To measure the throughput of the administrator, the throughput of the transition per unit of time Tadm was
computed in average interval of time.
We now put the parameters in Table 1 into the model in Figure 3, and run the model using the Möbius system55. From the
result of this study, the deployment of the DRM product has a significant impact on the operational efficiency of the organization.
Let us now consider one year of work after the deployment of the MS IRM in the network system of an organization, i.e., we
consider 124800 time units in the SAN model (this corresponds to 52 weeks of work, each working week having 40 working
hours). To measure the NPT, the time users spend in any place other than Users is computed. The NPT also includes the time
the user takes for sending an access request ( 1
rq
).
Figure 5 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the number of users for various values ofN (Number of confidential documents,
a user might use every day on average). The NPT includes: the time spent on sending an access request and authentication proce-
dures, and the time spent on waiting for a response from administrator. In addition, we also assume that there are 4 confidential























The Number of Users
Non-productive Time associated with MS IRM
Sim: N = 4, 1/r_ser = 0.01 sec
FIGURE 5 Total NPT associated with the deployment of MS IRM system. NPT increases significantly when the number of
authorized users served by each administrator increases. The total NPT is composed of two components: the time loss associated
with authentication process and the time loss associated with waiting on administrators when authorized users fail to pass the
authentication process.
4.6 Economic Model
In this section, the benefits and costs of implementing MS IRM products are compared using the concept of NPV.
As discussed previously, the benefit of the MS IRM system is the reduction in access of unauthorized users to confidential
documents. In this case study, after using the MS IRM system for one year, we assume that 4 confidential documents are
prevented from reading by unauthorized users. Use the assumed document value in Section 4.2, the annual benefits on documents
disclosure amounts to £100,000 (Table 3).
The capital expenditure of implementing MS IRM system includes the purchase of MS IRM system itself and any associated
costs to upgrade hardware and software. In addition, each year, 133.32 hours of NPT incurred as the result of the reduction in
organizational efficiency after the implementation of the MS IRM system (Figure 5). In order to translate NPT into monetary
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Annual Benefits Analysis on the Confidentiality of Documents by using MS IRM
Number of documents Single document value Total value
Confidential documents that are prevented
from being read by unauthorized users
4 £25,000 £100,000
Total benefits £100,000
TABLE 3 Benefits analysis of the MS IRM product. The benefit of the MS IRM system includes a reduction in unauthorized
access to confidential documents.
terms, the average salary of £60 per hour is used, therefore, in this study, the annual cost on NPT amounts to £7,999.2. For
many projects, this is a conservative estimate, because of high daily operational rate, for example, the daily rates of drilling
rigs in oil and gas industry. In addition, one administrator has to be hired to handle the MS IRM system and the requests in
the organization. The average salary for an administrator or information security specialist is £42,296 per year66; therefore, the
administrators’ costs are around £42,296 per year. Training of employees in this case is assumed to cost £20,000 per year. The
total costs associated with implementing MS IRM system is listed in Table 4.
Initial Capital Expenditure Costs by Deploying MS IRM
Type of costs Value
MS IRM software itself £1,121.65
Upgrade hardware or operating system £20,000
Total costs: £21,121.65
Annual Operational Costs by Implementing MS IRM
Type of costs Value




TABLE 4 Costs analysis of the MS IRM product. The costs of MS IRM product include initial capital expenditure on MS IRM
software and associated hardware and software upgrade cost. In addition, annual operational costs include administrator salaries,
NPT associated with the reduction of operational efficiency and employee training costs.
The NPV of implementing the MS IRM can be calculated as following:
NPV at year one = −K +
R1 − C1
(1 + i)1
= −£21, 121.65 + £100, 000 − £70, 295.2
(1 + 0.05)1
= £7, 168.64






= −£21, 121.65 + £100, 000 − £70, 295.2
(1 + 0.05)1
+ £100, 000 − £70, 295.2
(1 + 0.05)2
= £34, 111.77
In which, Rt represents the benefit of year t; t represents the cost of year t; K is the initial capital expenditure. The discount
rate i is assumed to be 0.05.
In this studied case, the NPV of implementing MS IRM is larger than 0. Therefore, the implementation project will bring
positive cash flow to the organization. It is, therefore, recommended to implement MS IRM into the organization’s network.
However, as discussed previously, this is the optimal case, in which the capital of the organization is unconstrained. For an
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organization with limited capital that has many profitable projects, projects with positive NPV will be compared against each
other and the ones that have higher rate of return might be chosen to be invested.
5 CONCLUSIONS
To assist security investors to make sensible investment decisions, a procedure that can quantitatively evaluate the benefits and
costs of implementing information security technologies was established. The deployment of MS IRM systemwas used as a case
study. In this example, the mechanism of MS IRM system is analysed; human behaviour of staff members in the organization
is studied. A group of security metrics were developed to measure the effectiveness of the MS IRM system. Furthermore, the
stochastic Petri nets are used to simulate and predict the impact of the deployment of the system on normal business processes.
The simulation results provided important information that the business needed for making decisions on whether or not to
implement this particular type of information security system.
This procedure was developed for the project in this particular case study under a set of assumptions; however, it has the
potential to be used as a general practice during the procurement process of information security products. Different assumptions
can be made and different parameters can be used based on the data collection of user behaviour study. These parameters are
used in the stochastic model to tailor the needs and requirements of the security investor.
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